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reinvestment, reacquisition for indebtedness or low income
housing reinvestment to the extent the basis represents the
basis of other property owned by the taxpayer or a related
person during 1980 (or 1986).28 The latter rule could apply
to tax-free exchanges involving farm buildings (20-year
property).29
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 6 Harl, Agricultural Law ch. 47 (1996);
Harl, Agricultural Law Manual  § 6.02 (1996).  See Harl,
“More on Related Party Sales,” 5 Agric. L. Dig. 185
(1994).
2 See 4 Harl, supra n. 1, ch. 29; Harl, supra n. 1, §
4.03[4].
3 I.R.C. § 179(d)(2)(A), (B).
4 See I.R.C. § 179(d)(2)(A).
5 I.R.C. § 168(f)(5)(A); I.R.C. § 168(e)(4), before
amendment by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514,
Secs. 201-204.
6 I.R.C. § 168(e)(4)(A), before amendment by Tax
Reform Act of 1986.
7 I.R.C. § 168(f)(5)(B)(i).
8 I.R.C. § 168(f)(5)(B)(ii).
9 For a comparison of the two depreciation systems, see 4
Harl, supra n. 1, §§ 29.05[2][c], 29.05[2][d].
10 I.R.C. §§ 168(b)(2)(B), 263A(e)(4).
11 I.R.C. § 263A(e)(4)(A). The definition also includes
operating a nursery or sod farm; the raising or harvesting
of trees bearing fruit, nuts or other crops; and ornamental
trees (other than evergreen trees more than six years old
when severed from the roots). I.R.C. § 263A(e)(4)(B).
12 I.R.C. § 168(b)(2)(B).
13 I.R.C. § 168(b)(2)(A).
14 See ns. 7 and 8 supra.
15 See n. 5 supra.
16 I.R.C. § 168(e)(4)(A)(i), before amendment by Tax
Reform Act of 1986.
17 Id.
18 I.R.C. §§ 168(e)(4)(D)(i), before amendment by Tax
Reform Act of 1986, 267(c)(4).
19 I.R.C. § 168(e)(4)(A)(i), before amendment by Tax
Reform Act of 1986.
20 I.R.C. § 168(e)(4)(H), before amendment by Tax
Reform Act of 1986.
21 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.168-4(d)(9).
22 See Drake v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (taxpayer’s interest in condominium purchased
from divorced spouse in 1981 eligible as recovery
property where spouse’s interest in condominium held
with taxpayer during marriage as tenants by entirety).
23 I.R.C. §§ 168(e)(4)(d)(ii), before amendment by Tax
Reform Act of 1986, 52(a), (b).
24 See I.R.C. § 168(e)(4)(C), before amendment by Tax
Reform Act of 1986.
25 I.R.C. § 168(e)(4)(A)(ii), before amendment by Tax
Reform Act of 1986.
26 I.R.C. § 168(e)(4)(A)(iii), before amendment by Tax
Reform Act of 1986.
27 I.R.C. § 168(e)(4)(A)(iv), before amendment by Tax
Reform Act of 1986.
28 I.R.C. § 168(e)(4)(B)(iii), before amendment by Tax
Reform Act of 1986.
29 I.R.C. § 168(c)(1).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
FENCE. The plaintiffs had purchased their land in 1967
with a barbed wire fence around it. The land was used to
graze cattle and the plaintiff planted trees along one portion
of the fence. In 1988, the defendant purchased neighboring
land and had the land surveyed. The survey showed the
fence to be on the defendant’s land and the defendant
removed the fence from the defendant’s land and replaced it
with a wooden fence. The plaintiff claimed ownership of the
disputed strip by adverse possession based upon the
existence of the fence. The plaintiff provided evidence that
the land had been continuously used for grazing cattle;
however, the court held that the fence was only a casual
fence, insufficient to show adverse possession, because the
plaintiffs failed to provide evidence of the original purpose
of the fence when it was constructed. The court also held
that mere pasturing of cattle was insufficient use to
constitute adverse possession. The court denied the
plaintiffs’ claim that the fence was the boundary by
acquiescence, because the plaintiffs failed to show that the
fence was considered the boundary line by previous owners
as a result of a boundary dispute. Mohnke v. Greenwood,
915 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).
The parties owned neighboring tracts of farm land
separated by a fence which had been in existence at its
current location since the 1880s. The court found that the
pre-1977 owners of the tracts had acquiesced to the fence as
the boundary between the tracts; however, in 1977 both
tracts were owned by one company for 15 days. In the
history of the tracts, all the conveyances and deeds
described the boundary truthfully without mentioning the
fence which was about 100 feet on to the defendant’s
property. The court held that the common ownership of both
tracts destroyed the acquiescence of the fence as the
boundary and started the time limits for adverse possession
anew; therefore, the plaintiff did not acquire title to the
disputed land by adverse possession. Salazar v. Terry, 911
P.2d 1086 (Colo. 1996), aff’g, 892 P.2d 391 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1994).
ANIMALS
ANIMAL NUISANCE. The defendant was convicted
twice of violating Revised Ordinance of Honolulu §§ 7-
2.2(a), 7-2.3 for keeping roosters which were noisy in the
early morning. In both cases the convictions arose from a
complaint of a neighbor and a single citation from an
investigating officer. The defendant argued that both
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convictions were improper in that the defendant was not
given a warning citation which provided specific
instructions as to what the defendant was required to do in
order not to be in violation of the ordinance. The court
agreed and held that in both cases, the ordinance required a
warning citation before a conviction for animal nuisance
could be imposed. The defendant also argued that the
keeping of roosters was a “permitted use” of the property
which prevented any conviction for animal nuisance. The
court held that the city zoning ordinances allowed the
raising of livestock on the property for commercial or food
raising purposes and that an issue of fact remained as to
whether the defendant was raising all of the roosters for
commercial or food raising purposes. The court noted that
the defendant gave some testimony that some of the roosters
were raised for showing and held the raising of roosters for
showing was not a permitted use under the city ordinances.
State v. Nobriga, 912 P.2d 567 (Hawai’i Ct. App. 1996).
BANKRUPTCY
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
ELIGIBILITY. The debtors had been sugarcane
farming since 1972. In 1991, the debtors purchased a tractor
in order to begin converting their operation to raising
soybeans. In 1994, the year before the filing of the Chapter
12 petition, the debtors were able to plant only a small
sugarcane crop and a late planted soybean crop; however,
the debtors produced gross income from farming of
$25,000. The debtors also had $1,400 of rental income from
a sharecropping arrangement. Because the income from
farming was low, the debtors sold the tractor and harvester
in 1994 which produced taxable gain of $31,000. In 1993,
the debtors began full-time off-farm employment and in
1994, earned combined wages of $37,000. A creditor
objected to the debtors’ plan, arguing that the debtors were
not eligible for Chapter 12 because more than 50 percent of
their income came from nonfarm sources. The creditor
argued that the equipment sales and sharecropping payments
were not farm income. The court held that the debtors were
engaged in farming in 1994 because they were at risk for the
crops they planted and the crop produced by the
sharecropper. The court also held that the equipment sales
were included in farm income because the equipment was
sold in order for the debtors to continue their farming
operation, albeit at a reduced level. The creditor also argued
that the determination of farm income could only be based
on the debtors’ 1994 Schedule F items of income. The court
rejected this argument as not required by the Bankruptcy
Code. Cottonport Bank v. Dichiara, 193 B.R. 798 (W.D.
La. 1996).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES . The debtor
originally filed for Chapter 11 but converted the case to
Chapter 7 after two years.  The IRS filed a claim in the
Chapter 7 case for post-petition, preconversion taxes plus
interest and penalties.  The parties agreed that the taxes and
interest were entitled to administrative expense priority but
disagreed as to the penalties. The court held that under
Section 503(b), the penalties were entitled to the same
priority as the taxes to which the penalties applied.
However, the court applied Section 510(c)(1) and
subordinated the penalties to all other priority claims, thus
causing the penalties to be paid pro rata with other second
priority claims. The IRS had also filed a claim after the
claims bar date in the Chapter 7 case for additional taxes for
the same period. The court allowed the additional claim as
an amendment to the original timely filed claim because the
amendment related to the same type of tax and the same
taxable period. The court also subordinated the penalties
associated with the additional taxes. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the Bankruptcy Court did not have the
authority to change the statutory priority order. United
States v. Noland, 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,252 (S.
Ct. 1996), rev’g, In re First Truck Lines, Inc., 48 F.3d
210 (6th Cir. 1995), aff'g unrep. D. Ct. dec. aff'g, 141 B.R.
621 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992).
PRIORITY. The IRS filed an unsecured claim for
unpaid taxes resulting from the debtor’s embezzlement of
funds. The debtor argued that the taxes were not entitled to
priority because the taxes were due more than three years
before the filing of the petition and because no priority is
provided for taxes which the debtor attempted to evade or
which resulted from a fraudulent return. The IRS argued
that the taxes were entitled to priority because the taxes
were assessable after the case was filed, under the extended
limitations period of I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A), because the
embezzled funds exceeded 25 percent of the debtor’s
reported income. The court held, however, that under
Section 523(a)(1)(C) the taxes are not entitled to priority
because the debtor filed a fraudulent return and willfully
attempted to evade payment of the taxes by not reporting the
embezzled funds as income. Matter of Zieg, 194 B.R. 469
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1996).
REOPENING CASE. The debtors filed for Chapter 13
and listed a claim for federal taxes with the amount set at
zero. The IRS was notified of the case and the deadline for
filing claims but did not file a claim until three months after
the bar date for claims. The debtors’ plan was confirmed
without objection from the IRS and provided for no
payment on the tax claim. At the end of the plan, the trustee
filed a report showing all plan payments had been made and
that the IRS claim was filed late and was not paid. The IRS
was notified about this report and failed to object. The
trustee’s report was approved, the debtors were discharged,
and the case was closed. Seven months later, the IRS filed a
motion to reopen the case, under Section 350(b), and vacate
the discharge. The court held that, because the order of
confirmation was within the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy
Court and did not deprive the IRS of due process, the
confirmation order could not be voided and a reopening of
the case was futile. The court rejected the IRS argument that
the failure of the debtors to provide for payment of priority
tax claims was a jurisdictional defect voiding the
confirmation order. In re Puckett, 193 B.R. 842 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1996).
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. The debtor was
assessed for FICA taxes in November 1981 and for FUTA
taxes in July 1983. The debtor executed a waiver in June
1986 which provided for an extension to December 1992 of
the period for collection of the taxes if an offer of
compromise was made, with an additional extension after
that date to equal the period of the pending offer plus one
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year. The debtor submitted an offer of compromise in
October 1986 and withdrew the offer in June 1987. In
March 1993, the debtor filed for Chapter 7 and received a
discharge in July 1991.  In August 1994, the extension
period under the waiver expired. On September 13, 1994,
the IRS attached the debtor’s assets for collection of the
taxes and on September 15, 1994, the debtor filed the instant
Chapter 13 case. The IRS argued that the Chapter 7 case
tolled the collection period under Section 108(c). The court
held that Section 108(c) did not apply because the waiver
agreement did not incorporate the extension provided by
Section 108(c) and because the end of the waiver period did
not occur during the Chapter 7 case. Because the period for
collection had expired prior to the Chapter 13 case, the IRS
had no viable claim for the taxes. In re Klingshirn, 194
B.R. 154 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996).
CONTRACTS
NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENT. The plaintiff
had been a 50 percent shareholder and officer in the
defendant corporation. The plaintiff’s employment was
terminated and a stock purchase agreement was executed
which prohibited the plaintiff from engaging in the
processing or sale of citrus concentrate or fresh juices for
three years. The plaintiff purchased a cold-storage facility
without objection from the defendant. The cold-storage
facility did some mixing of juices as part of its ordinary
services for its storage customers. The defendant refused to
make payments under the stock purchase agreement,
claiming that the plaintiff breached the noncompetition
clause because the mixing of juices was equivalent to
processing of juices. The court upheld the trial court’s ruling
that the mixing of juices did not violate the noncompetition
clause because the mixing was incidental to the cold-storage
business which was not prohibited by the noncompetition




AGRICULTURAL LABOR. The plaintiff was injured
while working on the defendants’ tobacco and sweet potato
farm and sued for violations of the Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Workers Protection Act (MSAWPA) and
negligence. The plaintiff was hired and worked under the
supervision of a farm labor contractor and the plaintiff
claimed that the defendants were liable as a joint employer
of the plaintiff. The court held that the defendants were joint
employers of the plaintiff with the labor contractor under the
nine factors of Haywood v. Barnes, 109 F.R.D. 568 (E.D.
N.C. 1986): (1) the defendants had the right and did control
the type and method of the plaintiff’s work; (2) the
defendants provided the instructions for supervision of the
plaintiff; (3) the defendants had the right to determine wage
rates; (4) the defendants had the right to determine who was
hired and fired; (5) the contractor was responsible for the
payroll books; (6) the defendants owned all of the real
property and most of the equipment used by the plaintiff; (7)
the plaintiff’s work did not require much expertise or skill;
(8) the defendants had significant investment in the property
used by the plaintiff; and (9) the plaintiff worked only for
the defendants during the crop season. Barrientos v.
Taylor, 917 F. Supp. 375 (E.D. N.C. 1996).
BRUCELLOSIS . The APHIS has adopted as final
regulations changing Wisconsin from an accredited-free
state to an accredited-free (suspended) state. 61 Fed. Reg.
16617 (April 16, 1996).
GRAIN STANDARDS . The Grain Inspection, Packers
and Stockyards Admin. (GIPSA) has adopted as final
regulations amending the grain standards for barley to
include two classes, malting barley and barley; to remove
the U.S. Choice grade for two-row malting barley; and to
revise several grading procedures and inspection standards.
61 Fed. Reg. 18486 (April 26, 1996).
HANDBOOKS. The plaintiff challenged the Forest
Service’s issuance of a special use permit for construction of
a communications tower on a butte on which the plaintiff
also had a tower. The plaintiff claimed that the permit
violated a Manual and Handbook published by the Forest
Service for use by its employees. The court held that the
Manual and Handbook was not entitled to any force or
effect of law because the book was not issued in accordance
with the procedural requirements of the Administrative
Procedures Act and was not issued under any statutory
authority. This case has similar implications for the FSA
handbooks. Western Radio Services Co., Inc. v. Espy, 79
F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 1996).
HERBICIDE. See Kuiper v. American Cyanamid
Co., 913 F. Supp. 1236 (E.D. Wis. 1996) summarized infra
under Products Liability.
MILK. The FSA has adopted as final regulations
continuing the Dairy Indemnity Payment Program to the
extent of the recently appropriated funds. 61 Fed. Reg.
18485 (April 26, 1996).
VACCINES. See Lynnbrook Farms v. Smithkline




INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX. The
decedent owned interests in several rental properties. The
decedent or the decedent’s daughter performed various
activities in managing the properties including (1)
interviewing prospective tenants, (2) enforcing lease terms,
(3) collecting rent payments, (4) various bookkeeping and
regulatory functions, and (5) making or contracting for
maintenance of the properties. However, the tenants
provided landscaping; snow and trash removal; air
conditioning, plumbing, painting, and electrical
maintenance; and fire insurance. The IRS ruled that the
decedent’s interests in the properties were not interests in
closely held businesses for purposes of I.R.C. § 6166. Ltr.
Rul. 9621007 (Feb. 13, 1996).
JOINT TENANCY PROPERTY. The decedent’s
predeceased spouse had inherited real property and
transferred the property to both of them as tenants by the
entirety in 1955. The spouse died in July 1989 and 50
percent of the value of the property was included in the
spouse’s estate. The decedent sold the property in 1990 and
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used the estate tax value for 50 percent of the property
(under the “fractional share” rule) as the basis for
determining gain from the sale. The decedent’s executor
filed an amended income tax return for the year of the sale
to use a basis of the full estate tax value of the property,
under the “consideration furnished rule, removing all gain
from the sale transaction. The issue was whether ERTA
1981 amendments to I.R.C. § 2040 providing for the
fractional share rule replaced the former “consideration
furnished” rule for pre-1977 joint tenancy transfers. The
court cited Gallenstein v. United States, 975 F.2d 286 (6th
Cir. 1992) to support its holding that the 1981 amendment
did not completely replace the previous rule and the
decedent was entitled to include the entire value of the
property for estate tax purposes as the property’s basis in the
sale.  Patten v. United States, 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 60,231 (W.D. Va. 1996).
V A L U A T I O N . The IRS has issued proposed
regulations which would allow reformation of a personal
residence trust within 90 days after a gift tax return is due
for the trust creation. The proposed regulations also provide
that a qualified personal residence trust cannot allow the
transfer of the residence to the grantor, the grantor’s spouse
or any entity controlled by the grantor or the grantor’s
spouse. This could have important implications for buying
back the residence after the period of the retained interest.
See Harl, “Reacquiring the Residence from a GRIT,” 6
Agric. L. Dig. 137 (1995). 61 Fed. Reg. 16623 (April 16,
1996), amending Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-5.
The taxpayer donated stock to a university in 1976 and
valued the shares at $10.00 each for federal income tax
charitable deduction purposes. The trial court used evidence
of subsequent sale transactions to determine the value of the
stock on the date of the gift. Although the appellate court
upheld the use of subsequent events to prove the value of
the gift, the case was remanded because the trial court's
valuation was not based on the evidence and was too
speculative. On remand, the court valued the stock based on
an adjusted net worth analysis with a discount for the
taxpayer’s minority interest. The value of intangibles was
not included for lack of evidence of their values and the
price determined by a buy-sell agreement was ignored
because of no evidence that the agreement was executed.
Krapf v. U.S., 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,249 (Fed.
Cls. 1996), on rem. from, 977 F.2d 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1992),
rem'g, 17 Cl. Ct. 750 (1989).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BAD DEBT. The taxpayer was an anesthesiologist who
purchased stock in a small corporation which operated a
printing business. The taxpayer made several loans to the
corporation which eventually became worthless and the
taxpayer claimed a business bad debt deduction for the
amount of the worthless loans. The court held that the
taxpayer was not entitled to a business bad debt deduction
because the taxpayer was not in the business of lending
money to corporations. Gubbini v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1996-221.
The taxpayer was a corporation which owned several
subsidiary corporations, one of which operated a lingerie
store. The taxpayer made payments on several expenses
incurred by the subsidiary while the subsidiary was
remodeling its store and the taxpayer received promissory
notes in return. When the store failed, the taxpayer claimed
the amounts owed on the notes as business bad debts. The
court examined 11 factors used in Roth Steel Tube Co. v.
Comm’r, 800 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1986), aff’g T.C. Memo.
1985-58 to determine whether the amounts paid by the
taxpayer were debt or equity. The court held that the
amounts were equity because (1) the subsidiary did not
make any principal or interest payments on the notes, (2) the
subsidiary was thinly capitalized, (3) the subsidiary’s
business was closely aligned with the taxpayer’s, (4) no
security was provided for the notes, (5) the subsidiary would
not have been able to obtain financing under similar terms
offered by the notes, (6) the funds were used for capital
expenses, and (7) the subsidiary did not maintain any
sinking fund for repayment of the notes. Deja Vu, Inc. v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-234.
BUSINESS EXPENSES. The taxpayer was a
corporation in the ready-mix concrete business. The
taxpayer rented trucks from a related corporation and the
lease provided that the lessor corporation was responsible
for the expenses for the tires on the trucks. The taxpayer
claimed that the lease was orally modified to make the
taxpayer responsible for the tire expenses. The court held
that the taxpayer failed to present sufficient evidence to
contradict the lease terms and disallowed a deduction for the
tires. Fountain Valley Transit Mix, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1996-244.
CAPITAL LOSSES. The taxpayer owned an 83 percent
interest in a partnership. The taxpayer established a trust for
the taxpayer’s grandchildren and named two unrelated
individuals as trustees. The taxpayer then sold the
partnership interest to the trust for adequate consideration, a
promissory note, which was less than the taxpayer’s income
tax basis in the partnership interest. The taxpayer argued
that, because the partnership interest was sold to the
trustees, the taxpayer was not considered the grantor of the
trust property and the transaction was not subject to the
I.R.C. § 267(a) disallowance of the capital loss on the sale
of the partnership interest to a related party. The court held
that the substance of the transaction was a sale of property
to the trust and, in such cases, the seller is considered the
grantor of the property and cannot recognize any capital loss
on the transaction under I.R.C. § 267(a). Meek v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1996-236.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The
taxpayer sued a previous employer for breach of contract
and for racial discrimination. The parties reached a
negotiated settlement with payment of two $70,000 checks
to the taxpayer. The settlement agreement did not allocate
any of the checks to the racial discrimination claim. The
taxpayer had no other evidence that one-half of the money
was paid for the racial discrimination claim; therefore, the
court held that none of the settlement amount could be
allocated to the racial discrimination claim. The case is
designated as not for publication. Strong v. Comm’r, 96-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,223 (9th Cir. 1996).
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HEALTH INSURANCE . After retiring, the taxpayer
began a boat charter and brokerage business as a sole
proprietorship. In 1990, the taxpayer financed a portion of
the business with interest income from a pension but the
business claimed a net loss on Schedule C. The taxpayer
claimed a deduction for health insurance premiums paid in
1990, arguing that the taxpayer’s income included the
interest income contributed to the business. The court held
that the deduction was not allowed because the taxpayer had
a net loss for the tax year. King v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1996-231.
HOME OFFICE. The taxpayer was an anesthesiologist
who performed medical services primarily at a hospital. The
hospital provided only minimal office services for the
taxpayer and the taxpayer performed all recordkeeping and
billing out of a home office. The taxpayer argued that the
taxpayer’s anesthesiology services were a separate business
from the billing business; therefore, the principal place of
business for the billing services was the home office,
allowing the taxpayer to claim deductions for expenses
relating to the home office. The court disagreed, holding
that the taxpayer’s principal business was anesthesiology,
that the principal place of that business was the hospital and
that the home office expenses were not deductible. Chong
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-232.
After retiring, the taxpayer began a boat charter and
brokerage business as a sole proprietorship. In 1990, the
taxpayer financed a portion of the business with interest
income from a pension but the business claimed a net loss
on Schedule C. The taxpayer claimed deductions for
expenses associated with a home office, arguing that the
taxpayer’s income included the interest income contributed
to the business. The court held that the deductions were not
allowed because the taxpayer had a net loss for the tax year.
King v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-231.
INTEREST. The taxpayer was a corporation to which
real property was contributed by a shareholder in exchange
for the corporation’s note. The corporation made no
payments on the debt to the shareholder until 12 years later.
The court held that the corporation could not deduct interest
payments because (1) no payments were made for 12 years,
(2) the corporation was inadequately capitalized, (3)
payments on the note depended upon the corporation’s
earnings, (4) no security was given for the note, (5) the
shareholder owned almost all of the corporation’s stock, and
(6) the corporation could not have obtained similar
financing from an unrelated third party. AMW
Investments, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-235.
INTEREST RATE.  The IRS has announced that for
the period July 1, 1996 through September 30, 1996, the
interest rate paid on tax overpayments is 8 percent and for
underpayments is 9 percent. The interest rate for
underpayments by large corporations is 11 percent. The
interest rate on corporate overpayments above $10,000 is
6.5 percent. Rev. Rul. 96-28, I.R.B 1996-__.
IRA. After retiring, the taxpayer began a boat charter
and brokerage business as a sole proprietorship. In 1990, the
taxpayer financed a portion of the business with interest
income from a pension but the business claimed a net loss
on Schedule C. The taxpayer claimed a deduction for
contributions to an IRA, arguing that the taxpayer’s income
included the interest income contributed to the business. The
court held that the deduction was not allowed because the
taxpayer had a net loss for the tax year. King v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1996-231.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES. The taxpayers were
shareholders in a corporation which attempted to sell real
property in a like-kind exchange using an escrow account
because the buyer did not own any suitable exchange
property. The corporation placed the cash from the sale into
the escrow account which had no restrictions on its use
except that the corporation was to designate the property to
be purchased with the funds within 180 days. The court held
that the escrow account had insufficient restrictions to
qualify the transactions as a like-kind exchange for federal
income tax purposes. Miller v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1996-214.
The taxpayer owned ranch land which was actively used
in the business of breeding, raising and selling cattle. The
county in which the land was located wanted to obtain a
scenic easement on the property and the taxpayer wanted to
obtain suitable like-kind property in exchange for the
easement. The taxpayer planned to obtain timber, farm or
ranch land in a three-party exchange and use the land for the
production of timber, crops or cattle. The IRS ruled that a
fee interest in timber, farm or ranch land would qualify as
like-kind property in exchange for the scenic conservation
easement on the ranch property. Ltr. Rul. 9621012, Feb.
16, 1996.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
TAX MATTERS PARTNER. The taxpayer was a
partner in a tax shelter partnership in which another partner
was the tax matters partner (TMP). The TMP became the
subject of a criminal investigation by the IRS and during
this investigation, the TMP consented to an extension of the
limitations period for assessing taxes attributable to
partnership items. During the extension but after the normal
period for assessments had expired, the taxpayer signed a
closing agreement which included deficiencies owed by the
taxpayer relating to partnership items. The taxpayer argued
that the closing agreement should be voided because the IRS
failed to inform the taxpayer about the criminal
investigation of the TMP which prohibited the TMP from
acting as TMP thus invalidating the extension of the
assessment period. The taxpayer argued that the IRS had a
fiduciary duty to inform the taxpayer since no other TMP
was designated. The court held that there was no statutory or
other authority that imposed a fiduciary duty on the IRS to
act as TMP if a new TMP is not designated; therefore, the
closing agreement was valid. The case is designated as not
for publication. In re Miller, 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,236 (9th Cir. 1996).
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in April 1996,
the weighted average is 6.93 percent with the permissible
range of 6.24 to 7.49 percent (90 to 109 percent permissable
range) and 6.24 to 7.63 percent (90 to 110  percent
permissable range) for purposes of determining the full
funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 96-32,
I.R.B. 1996-22, 7.
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The taxpayer was the sole shareholder of a corporation
which had established a defined benefit pension plan for all
employees, including the taxpayer. The plan prohibited the
assignment or alienation of vested benefits by any
participant. When the corporation ran into financial
difficulty, the taxpayer decided to provide additional cash to
the corporation by waiving the taxpayer’s interest in the
pension plan. The court held that the waiver resulted in the
value of the taxpayer’s interest in the plan being included in
the taxpayer’s gross income because the waiver was a
prohibited attempt to assign or alienate the interest in the
plan. Gallade v. Comm’r, 106 T.C. No. 20 (1996).
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
June 1996
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.88 5.80 5.76 5.73
110% AFR 6.48 6.38 6.33 6.30
120% AFR 7.08 6.96 6.90 6.86
Mid-term
AFR 6.58 6.48 6.43 6.39
110% AFR 7.26 7.13 7.07 7.03
120% AFR 7.93 7.78 7.71 7.66
Long-term
AFR 7.04 6.92 6.86 6.82
110% AFR 7.75 7.61 7.54 7.49
120% AFR 8.47 8.30 8.22 8.16
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
SECTION 1244 STOCK. The taxpayer was a
shareholder in an S corporation which terminated without
repaying the shareholders for their stock. The taxpayer
claimed the loss as an ordinary loss under I.R.C. § 1244.
The court disallowed the loss deduction because the
taxpayer failed to provide sufficient evidence of the stock
basis. Gubbini v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-221
UNRELATED BUSINESS INCOME. The taxpayer
was a nonprofit school which was established in 1909
through a gift of agricultural land. The school originally
provided a rural agricultural education but currently
provides a broader curriculum. Over the years the school
acquired additional tracts of farm land for teaching use but
the reduction in agricultural education courses made the
land an economic burden on the school. The school decided
to sell much of the land in small parcels over several years
to maximize the sale price and to minimize the effect on
other land prices in the community. The school also wanted
to maintain control over development near the school to
maintain the school’s rural atmosphere. The IRS ruled that
the sales of the property would not amount to a trade or
business and the income from the sales would not be
unrelated business income to the school. Ltr. Rul. 9619069,
Feb. 13, 1996.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
HERBICIDE. The plaintiff purchased the herbicide
Scepter which was manufactured by the defendant. The
plaintiff applied the herbicide to soybean fields in one crop
year after being told by the seller that it was safe to plant
corn on treated acres within 12 months after applying the
herbicide. The plaintiff testified that this information came
from the seller and not from any advertisements. However,
the same information was on the printed label on the
product. The plaintiff sought to hold the defendant liable for
negligent misrepresentation in advertising and the
statements of the seller. The defendant claimed that the
action was preempted by FIFRA. The court acknowledged a
split of authority on this issue as to advertisements and other
written materials not on the label; however, the court held
that the action was preempted, especially where, as here, the
plaintiff had not seen or relied on the advertisements.
Kuiper v. American Cyanamid Co., 913 F. Supp. 1236
(E.D. Wis. 1996).
VACCINES.  The plaintiff vaccinated cattle with two
vaccines produced by the defendant. Some of the cattle died,
either from failure of the vaccine to prevent disease or a
defect in the vaccines that caused the deaths directly. The
plaintiff sued the defendant in strict liability,
misrepresentation, false advertising, and breach of implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness for a specific
purpose. The vaccines were licensed under the Virus-
Serum-Toxin Act by APHIS and the defendant argued that
regulations issued by APHIS completely preempted the
plaintiff’s causes of action. The plaintiff challenged the
authority of APHIS to make such a regulation and the scope
of the regulation as to state common law causes of action.
The court upheld the preemption regulation as a rational and
necessary part of the authority granted to APHIS to control
and license vaccines. The court noted that a license by
APHIS was a determination by APHIS that the vaccine was
safe and effective; therefore, any state action which
challenged the safety or effectiveness of a licensed vaccine
was preempted by the APHIS regulations. The ruling leaves
little chance that any state law cause of action will be
allowed against a defective licensed animal vaccine.
Lynnbrook Farms v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 79
F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 1996).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
NONRESIDENT ALIEN OWNERSHIP OF LAND.
The Iowa legislature has passed legislation allowing
nonresident alien businesses which do not actively engage
in farming to own up to 1,000 acres and lease up to 280
additional acres of land in an economic development area.
House File 2234, enacted May 2, 1996.
STATE TAXATION
AD VALORUM TAXES . The plaintiff owned a grain
storage facility used to collect, inspect, clean, blend  and
store grain which was loaded on to ocean ships for export.
Under Art. 7, § 21(d)(2) of the Louisiana Constitution, grain
held for export was exempt from Louisiana ad valorum
taxes. The plaintiff’s county assessor determined that the
plaintiff’s facility did more than hold grain for export and
assessed ad valorum taxes on the grain passing through the
facility during the year. The court held that the small
amount of processing applied to the grain was not beyond
that required for preparing the grain for export and that the
grain was exempt from the ad valorum tax. Gisclair v.





AGRICULTURAL USE. The taxpayer owned two
parcels of land, each used only for growing pine trees. The
properties were rezoned as residential but the properties
contained no residences or habitable structures. The county
assessor then assessed the properties reflecting their use as
residential property based on the zoning change. The
taxpayer argued that the assessments should have been
made based on the actual use of the property. The court
held that Miss. Code § 27-35-50 required property
assessments to be made on the basis of the actual current
use of the property and that the growing of timber was
included in the definition of agricultural use. Riley v.
Jefferson Davis County, 669 So.2d 748 (Miss. 1996).
CITATION UPDATES
E. Norman Peterson Marital Trust v. Comm’r, 78
F.3d 795 (2d Cir. 1996), aff’g, 102 T.C. 798 (1994)
(generation skipping transfers) see p. 52 supra.
Mathis v. U.S., 917 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ind. 1996)
(marital deduction) see p. 52 supra.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $100
per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 to Agricultural
Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
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